Majoritarianization of the Iraqi system of governance

Yousef Mohammed Sadiq
31- 1- 2022

These days, more than ever, attempts are being made to break the tradition of consensus governance in Iraq, especially as Sadr Movement leader Muqtada al-Sadr always emphasizes the “national majority government” in his tweets. Of course, when you go to the content of Sadr’s program to form the next Iraqi government, you will see that his only goal is to prevent the participation of Nuri al-Maliki in the institutions of governance. Over the past 17 years, some political forces of this or that community have often not participated in the federal government, but it has never been called a majority government.

Meanwhile, there are calls for the first presidential election to be held in the presence of an absolute majority of members of the House of Representatives if a third of the members are not secured in April. The constitution (Article 70/1) requires a third of the members of the House of Representatives to vote for the successful candidate for the presidency in the first round of elections. It is obvious that according to Article 70/2 of the constitution, the second round cannot be held until the first round of elections is held.

It is true that according to Article 59/1, the quorum of each session of the House of Representatives is an absolute majority, but any item on the agenda of the House of Representatives that requires a vote requires the presence of a third of the members. The article does not require a vote of one-third of the members present, but a vote of one-third of all members of the House of Representatives. The working process in the House of Representatives has been the same. such as appealing the validity of members of the House of Representatives or voting on a federal court bill.

At the same time, looking at the direction of the discussions of the Constitution Drafting Committee in 2005, it is clear that the dominant direction was to give executive power to a consensus president, and therefore a majority of the case was set for his election. Even Humam Hamudi, the head of the committee, has suggested that if none of the presidential candidates win a majority of one-third of the parliamentary vote, wait 15 days to agree on a candidate. (See: Lectures of the Iraqi Constitution Book Committee 2005, Volume 1, 2018, pp. 524-527).

On the other hand, the existence of a quorum for the election of the president is the only guarantee of maintaining the balance of communities in the governance of Iraq, because the election of the president is the key to appointing a majority candidate to form the government. If this move does not remain the same, the majority will be able to control all presidencies directly and/or indirectly through cartoon people
This move, after the adjustment of the number of seats in the House of Representatives and the change in the balance of seats of communities in different provinces in 2009, will be another dangerous step to dominate the majority community (without a credible census) in Iraqi governance.

The excuse for the majority government is the failure of consensus governance in Iraq, which has led to party divisions and corruption. The apparent propagandists of the “national majority government” themselves have been the main characters of this division in the past and will remain so in the future. Just as the problem of governance in Iraq is not a federal or parliamentary system and decentralization as some want to imagine, so the problem in Iraq is not consensus rule.

In the absence of a federal council, Kurds and Sunnis will be the main losers in the majority of the Iraqi system of governance, even if it is for propaganda purposes. Although the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not been able to take advantage of Baghdad’s opportunities to resolve the long-standing Kurdish problems with Baghdad, but has worked for personal and party gains